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As a mechanism for shareholder control of corporate wrongs and thus as a tool of 
corporate governance, the statutory derivative action has had much international 
attention given to it, particularly in the last 10 years. Singapore introduced its 
statutory derivative action in 1993 and since then, there have been two reported 
cases in which the action was invoked. In this paper, I consider the Singapore 
derivative action as contained in sections 216A and 216B of the Singapore 
Companies Act. The approach taken is a comparative one as I also look at the 
statutory derivative actions in Australia and other common law jurisdictions. I 
then identify possible areas for review, with a view to enhancing the potential 




Conferring rights on minority shareholders to litigate in respect of wrongs to the 
company brings several issues to the fore. There are issues of standing, legal 
duties traditionally running a straight line to the company;1 of policing the action, 
since litigious shareholders may not have the most pristine of intentions; and of 
corporate governance, requiring a fine balancing of shareholder rights and 
expectations against the prerogative of management to manage.2 
 
At common law, the shareholder’s access to litigation to pursue actions rightly 
belonging to the company (by means of a derivative action) is very restricted. One 
of the cardinal principles of company law is embodied in the rule in Foss v 
                                                 
*  Associate Professor, School of Business, Singapore Management University, 
Singapore. 
1  Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 241. 
2  In most companies (both listed and unlisted) in Singapore, powers of management and 
control are vested in the board of directors: Art 73, Table A, Companies Act 1994, Cap 
50. In the United Kingdom, one finds a similar division of powers: see Art 70 of Table 
A. In Australia, see section 198A(1) Corporations Act 2001 and in New Zealand, see 
section 128 Companies Act 1993. 
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Harbottle3  - if a company suffers a wrong, then, because it is a separate legal 
entity from its incorporators, prima facie it is the company that should seek 
redress for that wrong. Additionally, if the alleged wrong is one that is capable of 
being approved or ratified by a majority of the shareholders, then no individual 
shareholder can maintain an action in respect of that wrong.  
 
The rule in itself is logical and can be said to achieve what is socially and 
economically desirable. For one, it reduces the scope for wasteful litigation. As 
English judge Mellish LJ explained more than a century ago: 
 
 … if the thing complained of is a thing which in substance the majority of the 
company are entitled to do … there can be no use in having litigation about it, 
the ultimate end of which is only that a meeting has to be called, and then 
ultimately the majority gets its wishes.4 
 
The rule also obliterates the potential for duplicative litigation. A wrong that has 
an adverse impact on a company’s financial position committed against the 
company could potentially also be detrimental for a number of stakeholder groups. 
In addition to the company’s shareholders, who could suffer loss because the value 
of their equity may be decreased as a result of the wrongdoing, the company’s 
creditors and employees may also have cause for complaint.  In the case of the 
company’s creditors, they may worry that there is a higher chance that the 
company would default on repayment. The employees, on the other hand, may find 
their jobs in jeopardy.5  If all such persons are allowed to sue, the company could 
literally be ‘torn to pieces’6 by litigation, the court system will be overly burdened 
and the defendants will have to face a multiplicity of suits.  
 
The other advantage of the rule lies in the fact that it allows management to 
decide whether to sue or not, without being second-guessed. Litigation may not 
always be in a company’s best interests and opinions will undoubtedly differ as to 
what is best for the company. Since deciding whether or not to sue is often a 
commercial decision, involving as it does a cost-benefit analysis with a necessary 
consideration of the potential damage to corporate reputation,7 it should therefore 
be a decision which management is qualified and competent to make. The rule 
also restricts the scope for tactical or vexatious litigation, ie legal proceedings used 
as a strategic ploy to gain some personal advantage, such as a good price for the 
litigant shareholder’s shares, or to pursue a personal vendetta against the 
directors.8 
                                                 
3  (1843) 67 ER 189, see also Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83. 
4  MacDougall v Gardiner (1875) 1 ChD 13 at 25. 
5  See BR Cheffins, ‘Reforming the Derivative Action: The Canadian Experience and 
British Prospects’ [1997] Company, Financial and Insolvency Law Review 227. 
6  La Compagnie de Mayville v Whitley [1896] 1 Ch 788 (CA), at 807 (Per Kay LJ). 
7  C Hale, ‘What’s Right with the Rule in Foss v Harbottle?’ [1997] Company Financial 
Insolvency Law Review 219 at 225. 
8  JH Farrar, et al, Farrar’s Company Law (4th ed, 1998) 431. 
(2001) 13 BOND LR 
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Difficulties however arise when a majority of the directors are themselves engaged 
in conduct detrimental to the company. It is unlikely that the board will take steps 
to ensure that the company sues the wrongdoers. While it is possible for a majority 
of shareholders in general meeting to act, this will not be done if the directors 
themselves are also the controlling shareholders. In such situations, the position 
for dissenting minority shareholders is particularly bleak, especially if there is no 
ready market for their shares or if they faced restrictions on the transfer of shares. 
In companies with a dispersed shareholding, difficulties associated with collective 
decision-making will in most cases prevent an action from going to court. One 
could say that the minority shareholder has reached a legal cul-de-sac. 
 
Therefore, if the rule is enforced in every situation, there will be manifest 
injustice9 as wrongdoers go unpunished and managerial wrongdoing not 
redressed.  Investors will be at the mercy of the majority who are advancing their 
own interests at the expense of the company.10 Common law recognised this and 
allowed a shareholder to take action in the company’s name if he could establish 
two elements. First, the wrong is one that cannot be validly ratified by the 
majority because it was a fraud on the minority and second that the perpetrators 
of the fraud were in control of the company. This gave rise to the common law 
derivative action. Unfortunately, the existing English authorities on the question 
of what exactly amounted to a fraud on the minority have been conflicting and 
difficult.11 There has in fact been no decision on the fraud on minority exception in 
Singapore, so that the problems of definition may actually be more perceived than 
real. Or, it could very well be that potential litigants have been so cowed by the 
inherent difficulties12 that no case has ever been brought! Be that as it may, it is 
accepted that the common law position is far from the ideal. Some idea of the 
genre of ‘affection’ common lawyers have for the rule in Foss v Harbottle  can be 
had from the comments of the Canadian Dickerson Committee13 on the Canadian 
statutory derivative action: 
 
In effect, this provision abrogates the notorious rule in Foss v Harbottle and 
substitutes for that rule a new regime to govern the conduct of derivative 
actions… [W]e have relegated the rule to legal limbo without compunction, 
convinced that the alternative system recommended is preferable to the 
uncertainties – and obvious injustices – engendered by that infamous 
doctrine.14  
                                                 
9  Nurcombe v Nurcombe [1985] 1 WLR 370 at 378 (per Browne-Wilkinson LJ). 
10  Ibid, at 432. 
11  See discussion in Farrar, ibid at 435; LS Sealy, Cases and Materials in Company Law 
(6th ed, 1996) at 522, 527; RR Pennington, Pennington’s Company Law (7th ed, 1995) 
876-885. 
12  As advised by well-taught lawyers educated on a diet of English cases. 
13  The recommendations of the Dickerson Committee led to the reform of the Canadian 
Business Corporations Act in 1975. 
14  Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada (1971) vol 1 para 482. 
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Some change to the existing rules was therefore necessary in order to give 
shareholders a significant role in corporate governance.  
 
This was recognised in a number of common law jurisdictions, all of which have 
either introduced or are considering the introduction of the statutory derivative 
action. New Zealand carried out major reforms to its company law regime in 1993, 
and amongst other initiatives, introduced the statutory derivative action to its 
company law legislation.15 Singapore also introduced its statutory derivative 
action16 in 1993 and since then, there have been two reported cases17 in which the 
action was invoked. Australia recently introduced the action into the Corporations 
Act after nearly a decade of study and deliberation.18 The UK Law Commission 
published a report in late 199719 recommending that a new statutory form of 
derivative action be available to shareholders in respect of breaches of duty by 
directors. The statutory derivative action can also be found in the United States, 
Canada and South Africa. 
 
The introduction of the statutory derivative action in many of these jurisdictions 
was prompted by the recognition that an enhanced shareholder role (as owner and 
investor) is necessary if management’s obligations and duties to its shareholders 
are to constitute more than a precatory body of law.20 In the United States, the 
derivative action is seen as very much as a regulator of corporate management21 
and one of the most effective means of enforcing the management’s duties and 
                                                 
15  Companies Act 1993. 
16  Sections 216A and B Companies Act 1994 Cap 50. 
17  Teo Gek Luang v Ng Ai Tiong and Ors [1999] 1 SLR 434 and Re Winpac Paper 
Products Pte Ltd; Seow Tiong Siew v Kwok Low Mong Lawrence and Ors [2000] 4 SLR 
768. There is one other unreported case Poh Kim Chwee v Lim Swee Long (HC 
Singapore, OS No 376 of 1997). 
18  The Companies and Securities Law Review Committee made the initial 
recommendation in 1990 in their report, Enforcement of the Duties of Directors and 
Officers of a Company by Means of a Statutory Derivative Action (Report No 12, 1990). 
Subsequently, the action was discussed in the Report of the House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Corporate Practices and the 
Rights of Shareholders Recommendation 26 (1991); the Companies and Securities 
Advisory Committee’s Report on a Statutory Derivative Action (1993); in the 
Corporations Law Simplification Task Force’s Commentary on Draft Provisions 
Dealing with Proceedings on Behalf of a Company by Members and Others (1995); and 
in the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) Proposals for Reform, 
above n 29. The Australian statutory derivative action was introduced by the 
Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 and is found in sections 236 and 
237 of the Corporations Law.  
19  Shareholder Remedies (Law Com No 246) (1997). See E Ferran, ‘Shareholder 
Remedies: The Law Commission Report’ [1998] Company Financial Insolvency Law 
Review  235 for a discussion of the recommendations. 
20  American Law Institute Tentative Draft No 6 at 3. 
21  Cohen v Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp 337 US 541, 548 (1949). 
(2001) 13 BOND LR 
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obligations under the law.22 The private derivative action was seen as a means of 
complementing and enhancing the existing regulatory capability of social and 
market forces and the public administration.  
 
In other common law jurisdictions, the introduction of a statutory procedure to 
govern the conduct of derivative actions was considered necessary to counter the 
restrictive nature of the rule in Foss v Harbottle and to allow the derivative action 
to function as an effective tool of corporate governance. In Canada, the Dickerson 
Committee felt that the best means of enforcing a corporation law is to confer 
reasonable power on the allegedly aggrieved party to initiate legal action to 
resolve the problem.23 
 
In New Zealand, the statutory derivative action is seen as a means for the more 
effective enforcement of the obligations under the constitution of the company and 
under their Act.24 Australia was motivated by the desire for a more potent and 
accessible weapon to deter and punish managerial misconduct,25 the state of the 
existing law being inadequate for this purpose because of the restrictive nature of 
the rule in Foss v Harbottle .26 It is interesting to note that some Australian 
commentators questioned the need to introduce a statutory form of the derivative 
action. This was due to the observation that the Australian judiciary appears more 
than willing to avoid the insidious web woven by the rule in Foss v Harbottle .27 In 
particular, this robust attitude towards minority shareholder rights was 
manifested in the increasing judicial support for a fifth exception ‘in the interests 
of justice’28 to the rule in Foss v Harbottle , and in the expansive view taken of 
                                                 
22  This statement must be seen in the context of the unique environment for derivative 
actions in the United Sates. A significant factor is the fact that successful plaintiffs 
are awarded counsel fees, providing a financial incentive to attorneys to police 
management. 
23  Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada, above n 14, 476. 
24  Law Commission’s Report No 9: Company Law: Reform and Restatement, para 86. 
25  deVere Stevens, above n 25, 127. 
26  See the Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program 
Bill 1999 paras 6.14 – 6.15. 
27  See Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law para 11.250; LS Sealy, ‘The Rule in Foss v 
Harbottle: the Australian Experience’ (1989) 10 Company Lawyer 52; I Ramsay, 
‘Corporate Governance, Shareholder Litigation and the Prospects for a Statutory 
Derivative Action’ (1992) 15 University of New South Wales Law Journal 149 at 159ff. 
28  In Biala Pty Ltd v Mallina Holdings Ltd (No 2) (1993) 11 ACSR 785 at 848, Ipp J 
opined: 
Equity is concerned with substance and not form, and it seems to me to be 
contrary to principle to require wronged minority shareholders to bring 
themselves within the boundaries of the well recognised exceptions and to deny 
jurisdiction to a court of equity even where an unjust or unconscionable result 
may otherwise ensue...The circumstances of modern commercial life are very 
different to those which existed when Foss v Harbottle was decided. The body of 
shareholders of a public company is ordinarily far greater in number, and the 
controlling minds of individual shareholders are far more difficult to identify than 
was the case with the relatively small corporations that existed 150 years ago. 
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shareholders’ personal rights, which effectively bypassed the procedural 
difficulties of Foss v Harbottle . Nevertheless, it was the considered opinion of 
CLERP that this attitude of the courts in itself engendered a certain amount of 
uncertainty,29 and the availability of a ‘direct accountability mechanism that can 
be used by shareholders in an efficient and effective manner’ would do much to 
remove this uncertainty in the interests enhancing corporate governance and 
maintaining investor confidence.30 
 
The United Kingdom, birthplace of the Rule in Foss v Harbottle , has also put the 
action under the microscope.  
 
According to the Corporations Law Simplification Task Force,31 the overall 
objective of introducing a statutory derivative action to confer rights on 
shareholders should be to provide an incentive for management to exercise its 
powers appropriately and discharge its functions for the ultimate advantage of the 
shareholders. 
 
In Singapore, the Select Committee clarified that the primary purpose for the 
inclusion of section 216A is to provide minority shareholders with greater 
remedies, thereby strengthening the rights of the minority shareholder. In the 
first reported decision on the section, Lai Kew Chai J stated that ‘such 
derivative… actions are intended to improve the standards of private corporate 
governance since directors who breach their duties to the company could be made 
accountable.’32 
 
In essence, it can be said that the statutory derivative action has primarily a 
deterrent objective – by empowering the shareholders and others, it serves to 
deter managerial misconduct by imposing the threat of liability. This deterrent 
effect of the action, because it does not result in positive actions, cannot be 
measured empirically. It is important to acknowledge this because there have 
been a number of empirical studies in the United States that show that derivative 
actions produce little financial benefit, both to the shareholder litigant in the 
                                                                                                                                 
These developments and the complexities and sophistication of modern 
shareholding make it often very difficult to bring derivative claims within the 
established exceptions. To the extent that policy may be relevant in determining 
whether a fifth and general exception to the rule should be recognised, I consider 
it to be desirable to allow a minority shareholder to bring a derivative claim 
where the justice of the case clearly demands that such a claim be brought, 
irrespective of whether the claim falls within the confines of the established 
exceptions.  
29  Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) Proposals for Reform, Paper No 3, 
Directors’ Duties and Corporate Governance (1997) at para 5.3.2. 
30  Ibid. 
31  Corporations Law Simplification Task Force, Commentary on Draft Provisions Dealing 
with Proceedings on Behalf of a Company by Members and Others (1995)) (CLSTF 
Report (1995)). 
32  Teo Gek Luang v Ng Ai Tiong and Ors, above n 17, 438. 
(2001) 13 BOND LR 
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sense that there is little positive impact on share prices,33 and to the company.34 A 
corollary objective would be to ensure that directors pay heed to their legal duties. 
Although directors’ duties are owed formally to the company and not to individual 
shareholders, it is essentially shareholders’ interests that are protected by the 
imposition of these duties.35 The imposition of duties sets bounds to the directors’ 
exercise of corporate powers, and attempts to control the exercise of managerial 
discretion and self-interested behaviour. However, the effectiveness of such duties 
and controls depends on there being realistic enforcement, or at least the prospect 
thereof. However, as alluded to earlier, there are difficulties with this because, 
circuitously, the directors owe these duties to the company and the company’s 
decision to call the directors to account is made for it by the board. As Parkinson 
observed in his thesis: 
 
 [I]t is conceptually inelegant that the duties designed to control management 
should be enforceable only by management itself; the right to enforce the 
apparatus of control is surely distinguishable from the power to make 
decisions about the operation of the business and as such should not be 
regarded as a matter falling within the exclusive discretion of the board.36 
 
Whilst the general meeting has the residual power to remove the board and/or 
litigate in such situations, this is unlikely, in the case of closely-held companies 
because the majority shareholders are likely themselves to be the directors and in 
the case of public widely-held companies, to garner the support required to launch 
such actions would be a Herculean task in itself. Duty-based controls therefore 
depend very much on shareholder enforcement. Indeed, in Singapore, cases in 
which the company itself calls directors to account are relatively rare.37 
  
The Singapore Provisions - A Comparative Consideration 
 
The Singapore derivative action is modelled after the statutory derivative action 
in the Canadian Business Corporations Act and is found in sections 216A and 
216B of the Companies Act Cap 50. Section 216A allows a complainant to apply to 
the court for leave to bring an action in the name of and on behalf of the company, 
or to intervene in an action to which the company is a party. In this part, the 
                                                 
33  D Fischel and M Bradley, ‘The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in 
Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis’ (1986) 71 Cornell Law Review 
261. 
34  R Romano, ‘The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation’ (1991) 7 Journal of 
Law, Economics and Organisation 56. 
35  The main fiduciary duty owed by directors is the duty to act bona fide in the interests 
of the company and these interests have time and again been equated with the 
interests of the shareholders a whole. 
36  JE Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility – Issues in the Theory of Company 
Law (1993). 
37  I did a search on Lawnet (http://www.lawnet.com.sg) and found 7 reported cases since 
1993 in which the company sued its directors for breach of duties.  
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A ‘complainant’ is defined as meaning any member of a company; the Minister for 
Finance in respect companies under investigation;38 and ‘any other person who, in 
the discretion of the Court, is a proper person to make an application’ under the 
section.39 This is similar to the position in Canada although the Canadian 
definition is slightly broader. The Canadian Business Corporations Act40 and most 
of the provincial cognate statutes41 also have a catchall ‘proper person’ category 
but include in their express pool of ‘complainants’, past and present shareholders, 
past and present directors or officers, and security holders. Nevertheless, the 
Singapore derivative action is potentially available to a wider class of applicants 
than the New Zealand, Australian and proposed United Kingdom provisions 
respectively allow, and definitely wider than that which existed at common law.  
 
In New Zealand, only current shareholders and directors are included in the pool 
of potential applicants. The Australian provisions42 confer standing on a member, 
a former member and a person entitled to be registered as member of the company 
or of a related company, as well as an officer or former officer of the company. The 
proposed UK provisions are available only to existing members, which is the 
position at common law. There is no catchall class in the derivative actions of 
these jurisdictions and the respective lists of persons who can apply to bring a 
derivative action appear exhaustive.  
 
At first blush, a wide grant of standing accords with the deterrence aim of the 
derivative action. Certainly, if the directors and management know or believe that 
their actions can be taken to task by a larger class of interested stakeholders, they 
will, in theory, be deterred from acting without care and/or without regard for 
their duties. The English Law Commission, however, is unconvinced of the merits 
of a wide grant of power,43 and indeed there are practical problems associated with 
too wide a grant. Former shareholders and directors are more likely to be acting in 
their own interests rather than in the company’s interests, given that they are no 
longer directly associated with the company. Certainly, there is justification for 
not granting standing to debenture holders as this could be providing them with 
                                                 
38  Under Part IX of the Companies Act Cap 50 which defines the situations in which the 
affairs of a company may be subject to an investigation authorised by the Minister for 
Finance.  
39  s 216A(1). 
40  See s 238. 
41  Including s 245 Ontario Business Corporations Act. 
42  S 236 Corporations Act 2001. 
43  ‘We feel that there can be no point in extending the derivative action to former 
members, since there is bound to be a current member who (if the wrong has not been 
ratified) could maintain proceedings.’ 
(2001) 13 BOND LR 
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the means to interfere with management. Although the other pre-requisites to the 
bringing of the action should and are meant to take care of the obviously 
unmeritorious cases, there may be cases that may slip through the net, 
notwithstanding and in spite of an improper motive. In such ‘borderline’ cases, 
there will probably be a need for more vigilant supervision of the conduct of the 
proceedings.44 
 
The judiciary in Canada appears to agree. In practice, most of the applications 
reviewed in one study were brought by current shareholders.45 But where the 
applications were made by former shareholders46 or former directors,47 these were 
denied primarily because the judges felt that such applicants lacked ‘sufficient 
interest’ in the outcome of the derivative action. This was notwithstanding the fact 
that these classes of applicants have a prima facie right conferred by legislation to 
bring the application. In Jacobs Farm Ltd v Jacobs,48 Blair J opined that ‘it could 
not have been the intention of the Legislature … to clothe every former 
shareholder and every former director with the status of a complainant for the 
purposes of bringing a derivative action’. Baynton J of the Saskatchewan Court of 
Queen’s Bench explained the necessity for this ‘sufficient interest rule’ as follows: 
 
Such a rule is required to distinguish between applicants who have a bona 
fide potential financial stake through the corporation in the outcome of the 
derivative action and applicants who seek leave for an improper purpose. The 
latter category of applicant has no right to meddle in the affairs of the 
corporation regardless of whether or not the derivative action is in the 
interests of the corporation. It is for this reason that the sufficient interest 
rule respecting an applicant is distinct from the best interests test respecting 
the corporation.49 
 
This seems rather a strict position to take as it would exclude persons who are 
genuinely pursuing the action for ‘the principle of the matter’, who would have no 
‘financial stake’ in the outcome of the action, rare though admittedly this might 
be. 
 
Preconditions to the grant of leave 
 
Section 216A sets out the preconditions to the court granting leave for the 
bringing of such an action. These preconditions constitute a screening mechanism 
                                                 
44  L Taylor, ‘The Derivative Action in the Companies Act 1993’ (1999) 7 Canterbury Law 
Review 314 at 316. [In Schafer v International Capital Corporation [1997] 5 WWR 99 
(Sask QB), an application by an ex-director was declined because personal vendetta 
was the primary reason.] 
45  Cheffins, above n 5, 239. 
46  Eg Jacobs Farms Ltd v Jacobs (1992) OJ No 813 (Ont Gen Div). 
47  Schafer v International Capital Corporation [1997] 5 WWR 99 (Sask QB). 
48  (1992) OJ No 813 (Ont Gen Div). 
49  Ibid, at 104. 
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to sift out cases that are without merit. The court must be satisfied as to three 
things: First, that the complainant has given 1450 days’ notice to the directors of 
the company of his intention to apply to the Court, if the directors of the company 
do not bring, diligently prosecute or defend or discontinue the action. Second, that 
the complainant is acting in good faith; and third, that it appears to be prima facie 





The requirement to give notice is a compulsory requirement, the objective being to 
give the company the opportunity, through its board of directors, to consider its 
rights and course of action. This is recognition that the cause of action rightly 
belongs to the company, and it should therefore have the first option of pursuing 
its own rights. Indeed, this precondition is common in other jurisdictions.51 Under 
the Australian provisions,52 as it also is under the English Law Commission’s 
recommendations,53 notice to the company (although the precise period differs) is a 
precondition to the grant of leave for a shareholder to pursue the statutory 
derivative action. 
 
One of two possible consequences may result from the giving of the notice.54 The 
directors may decide that the company should shoulder the responsibility for the 
suit, thus making the derivative action unnecessary. Or the directors may take 
such steps as to correct or remedy the situation55 that formed the basis for the 
derivative action. Section 216A is silent on the precise form of the notice and how 
much information is required. Presumably, the notice must contain at least 
sufficient information to allow the directors to decide what to do. The Canadian 
authorities have not taken a technical view of this requirement. Thus, a written 
request that the board takes action together with details of the claim comprised in 
a letter to the board appears sufficient.56  
 
                                                 
50  For arguments in favour of a longer notice period, see J Poole and P Roberts, 
‘Shareholder Remedies – Corporate Wrongs and the Derivative Action’ [1999] Journal 
of Business Law 99 at 104. 
51  Section 216A(4) allows the court to make such interim order as it thinks fit where the 
complainant establishes that it would not be expedient to give notice as required (such 
as where the directors are hostile or under the domination of the wrongdoers). 
52  S237(2) Corporations Law: the notice period is 14 days, and the applicant must give 
written notice of the reasons for the application. 
53  Draft Rule 50.4(1), Appendix B to LCR 246: the notice period is 28 days. 
54  Cheffins, above n 5, 245. 
55  Including internal sanctions such as dismissal or demotion of a defendant employee: 
see American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and 
Recommendations 1994 at 55. 
56  See B Welling, Corporate Law in Canada (2nd ed, 1992) at 527- 528. 
(2001) 13 BOND LR 
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Section 216A(4) allows the court to make such interim order as it thinks fit where 
the complainant establishes that it would not be expedient to give notice as 
required. Presumably, this envisages situations where the directors are hostile, 
under the domination of the wrongdoers, or where timeous litigation is of the 
essence. In a similar manner, section 237(2)(e) of the Corporations Act 2001 gives 
the court the discretion to grant leave, even where notice was not given to the 
company, if it is satisfied that it would be appropriate to do so.  The proposed UK 
procedure too, authorises the court, on application, to dispense with the notice 
requirement for reasons of urgency.57  
 
The position is broadly similar in the United States. A shareholder in the United 
States must provide the board of directors with a demand to sue prior to the 
pursuit of derivative litigation. In most United States jurisdictions, demand is 
excused when it is futile to expect the directors to make a reasoned and unbiased 
decision on the matter, as where the directors are themselves interested in the 
challenged transaction.58 A complex and inexact jurisdiction has arisen out of 
what constitutes ‘futility’ that excuses demand. To simplify the prevailing law, the 
American Law Institute has recommended that demand be made a universal 
requirement. Under the recommendations, demand should be ‘excused only if the 
plaintiff makes a specific showing that irreparable injury to the corporation would 
otherwise result, and in such instances, demand should be made promptly after 




The requirement that the shareholder is acting in good faith is said to be 
necessary in order to preclude personal vendettas and vexatious actions. 
Questions have been raised as to whether this requirement has a valid and 
independent role to play,60 for if the case is itself meritorious, good faith of the 
applicant is likely to be present in any event. That the good faith requirement has 
little import appears to be borne out implicitly by the first reported decision on 
section 216A.  
 
In Teo Gek Luang v Ng Ai Tong,61 the applicant was a shareholder and director in 
a company known as Transcity Cargo System Pte Ltd. She applied for leave to 
commence a derivative action in the name and on behalf of the company, the 
object of which was to recover a sum allegedly owed by the company’s managing 
director to the company. Lai J accepted that the applicant did not, at the time of 
                                                 
57  Law Commission Consultation Paper No 142, Paras 16.15-16.17; Law Commission 
Report 246 on Shareholder Remedies, 24 Oct 1997 para 6.58 - 6.59. Draft Rule 50.4(3), 
Appendix B to LCR 246. 
58  See American Law Institute, see above n 55, 54-57. 
59  Ibid, para 7.03(b). 
60  Welling, above n 56, 528: ‘I have no idea what this means [I suspect that it is 
meaningless], and I get the sense that no one else does either.’ 
61  [1999] 1 SLR 434. 
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the application, have a happy relationship with the board, and indeed had 
personal disputes with the managing director, but held that these matters taken 
together did not constitute bad faith. Although the applicant may not be 
completely neutral and objective in her view of things, there was nevertheless 
substance in her complaint that the directors should not have allowed the 
managing director’s loans to remain outstanding for so long without a reasonable 
and realistic schedule for repayment. Her application was therefore granted.  
 
The applicant in the unreported case of Poh Kim Chwee v Lim Swee Long (OS No 
376 of 1997) had personal disputes and had also fallen out with the defendant. 
Similarly, in the later case of Seow Tiong Siew v Kwok, Fung & Winpac Paper 
Products Pte Ltd,62 the relationship between the applicant and the defendant was 
acrimonious. In both of these cases, the applications were dismissed, primarily 
because of the lack of merit in the claims themselves. The court however, made 
specific reference to evidence that the respective applicants had been motivated by 
considerations other than the interests of the company. It appears therefore that if 
the action itself is meritorious, the court is not overly concerned that the 
applicant’s self-interest or other considerations may have motivated the 
application. On the other hand, where the claims are not in the interest of the 
company, the lack of good faith on the part of the complainant reinforces the case 
for dismissal. In truth, there are probably too few cases on section 216A to 
conclude how the Singapore courts will approach the good faith requirement. But 
the road the courts have thus far chosen to tread appears a sensible one. An 
applicant may benefit commercially if he succeeds in the derivative action, and 
can thus be said to have an ulterior motive in bringing it. But if the case is a 
meritorious one and if the court considers that the applicant is an appropriate 
person to bring the action, there seems little reason not to allow the action to be 
brought. The motives of the applicant should take a backseat role in such cases. 
 
In Canada, there have been cases on both sides of the fence. Some cases suggest 
that the good faith requirement will likely be met if the derivative action appears 
to be in the interest of the company.63 But there have been other cases in which 
the good faith requirement was considered a serious issue to be considered so that 
a lack of good faith was ground enough for denying an application for leave.64 In 
the latter cases, the onus to demonstrate good faith is one that must be discharged 
by the applicant.  
 
The good faith of the applicant is also a criterion that the Australian court must be 
satisfied in respect of before making a decision to grant leave, and is one designed 
to prevent proceedings being used to further the purposes of the applicant, rather 
than the company as a whole.65 There is no directly equivalent requirement in the 
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New Zealand statutory derivative action, whilst the UK proposals do not put good 
faith as an independent condition to be satisfied for leave to be granted but merely 
as a relevant factor to be considered.  
 
Interest of the Company 
 
A third precondition that the applicant must also establish is that the action is 
prima facie in the interest of the company.66 A similar precondition to leave exists 
in Canada and in Australia. The Canadian courts have often equated the 
likelihood of success at trial with the interests of the corporation although this 
approach is clearly open to criticism.67  In Australia, this criterion is said68 to 
allow the court to focus on the true nature and purpose of the proceedings, giving 
due recognition to the reality that there may be sound business reasons for the 
company’s decision against pursuing a course of action that is open to it. To this 
end, section 237(3) of the Corporations Act 2001 provides that a rebuttable 
presumption that granting leave is not in the company’s interests arises if it is 
established that: 
 
· the proceedings are by the company against a third party or vice versa; 
 
· the company has decided not to bring or be otherwise involved in the 
proceedings; and 
 
· all the directors who participated in that decision acted in good faith for a 
proper purpose; did not have a material personal interest in the decision; are 
themselves appropriately informed about the subject matter of the decision; 
and rationally believed that the decision was in the best interests of the 
company.69  
 
The English Law Commission’s initial proposal put the company’s interests as a 
factor to be considered by court when deciding whether to grant leave or not but 
this is now specified additionally as a pre-requisite70 in accordance with the 
responses to the Consultation Paper received. The New Zealand approach is 
                                                                                                                                 
para 5.3.2 See also Paras 6.34-6.48 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporate 
Law Economic Reform Program Bill 1999. 
66  See eg Koh, ‘For Better or For Worse - The Statutory Derivative Action in Singapore’ 
(1995) 7 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 74; Ramsay, above n 27, 149; Maloney 
‘Whither the Statutory Derivative Action?’ (1986) 64 Canadian Bar Review 309. 
67  Ibid, at 251. It is not always beneficial for a corporation to sue because although the 
cause of action is legally viable, it is not commercially so. 
68  Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) Proposals for Reform, above n 29, 
para 5.3.2. 
69  It is specifically provided that a director’s belief is rational unless the belief is one that 
no reasonabl person in his position would so hold. 
70  Draft Rule 50.8(3) provides that ‘The court must refuse leave and dismiss the 
derivative claim if it is satisfied that the claim is not in the interests of the company’. 
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slightly different. The court shall have regard71 to, inter alia,72 the interests of the 
company in the proceedings, but to grant leave, it must be satisfied that either the 
company does not intend to bring the proceedings, or the action is in the interests 
of the company73. Whether the derivative action is in the interests of the company 
is therefore not strictly a prerequisite the granting of leave in New Zealand.  
 
In Teo Gek Luang, the Singapore High Court held that the proper approach was 
for the court to be satisfied that there was a reasonable basis for the complaint 
and that the action sought to be instituted was a legitimate or arguable one, on 
the basis of affidavit evidence.74 The court expressed reservation with the view of 
the Ontario Court of Appeal75 that the section should be accorded a liberal 
interpretation in favour of the complainant. The court proceeded as follows: 
 
 Management decisions should generally be left to the Board of Directors. 
Members generally cannot sue in the name of his company. A minority 
shareholder could attempt to abuse the new procedure, which would be as 
undesirable as the tyranny of the majority directors who unreasonably refuse 
to act.76 
 
This position was echoed in the subsequent case of Seow Tiong Siew v Kwok, Fung 
& Winpac Paper Products Pte Ltd.77 The applicant here was a shareholder and 
director of Winpac Paper Products. He brought the application under section 216A 
for leave to bring four actions, three of these were against third parties and the 
last was against directors of the company for breach of directors’ duties in 
connection with the failure to commence the three actions. Goh J opined that 
matters of management should be left to the board of directors and the court 
would not question the correctness of such decisions, if they were bona fide arrived 
at.78 Similarly in the unreported decision of Poh Kim Chwee v Lim Swee Long,79 
the applicant was a shareholder and director of a company, Hypertech 
Development Pte Ltd. He applied for leave to intervene in an action against the 
company for the purpose of defending the action and to raise a counterclaim on 
behalf of the company; and to bring an action against the other shareholder and 
director for breach of directors’ duties. Leave for both actions was refused. The 
court found the defences to be frivolous and vexatious; that no arguable case was 
                                                 
71  Section 165(2) Companies Act 1993.   
72  The other factors are the likelihood of the proceedings succeeding; the costs of the 
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73  Section 165(3). 
74  [1999] 1 SLR 434 at 438. 
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76  [1999] 1 SLR 434 at 438. 
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established that the company had a counterclaim and that the action for breach of 
duty was spurious. The court began by stating the following: 
 
 Whether or not to embark upon litigation is a management decision for the 
company and it must follow that whether or not to defend an action is equally 
a management decision for the company. It may or may not be worth the 
company’s while to devote the resources (financial and managerial) to defend 
the action. The cost of litigation would be financed by the company and could 
exceed any possible benefits that the company would reap. The court would 
not sit as a court of appeal from management decisions honestly arrived at. 
 
As it stands in Singapore, it appears that the business judgment rule has a 
significant role in the statutory derivative action. This is also the position 
recommended by the English Law Commission, which has said that a judge in 
dealing with the issue of the interests of a company, should have regard for 
decisions of the board made in good faith, on proper information and in the light of 
relevant considerations.80 Thus, Draft Rule 50.10 requires the court to take into 
account the view of the company’s directors on commercial matters when 
considering whether the claim is in the interests of the company. This is 
effectively an application of the business judgement rule. Such an approach deals 
with the legitimate concerns thrown up by shifting the decision to litigate away 
from the commercial arena to one that is in the purview of the courts, a task that 
may not be relished by the judiciary.  
 
As was already mentioned, decisions to litigate are in a sense commercial 
decisions, involving not only cost-benefit analyses, but also considerations of 
potential damage to the company’s reputation. Undue and unnecessary litigation 
will certainly do more harm than good for the company. As one commentator put 
it, ‘there will often be sound reasons for avoiding the washing of corporate linen in 
the courtroom’.81 There is therefore merit in saying that these are decisions best 
made by a commercially minded board.  
 
The fear however, is that too much deference to the business judgment rule will 
remove much of the bite from the statutory derivative action and deprive it of the 
ability to perform the very function it was created to perform, that of policing 
boards of directors. Some middle path must therefore be found, something 
undoubtedly easier said than done. One possibility is to do what Australia did, by 
providing for a link between the business judgment rule and the statutory 
derivative action in the form of a rebuttable presumption that, in certain spelt out 
                                                 
80  LCCP No 142, pp 143, 164 -165. The Law Commission in its report did clarify that this 
does not mean that the court would be bound to accept the views of the directors. The 
existence of a conflict of interest may affect the weight to be given to them, and the 
court would give no weight to views which no reasonable director in that position could 
hold: Law Commission Report, Shareholder Remedies, Law Com No 246, Cm 3769 (Oct 
1997, London, HMSO ) para 6.79. 
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situations, proceeding with litigation will not be in the company’s interests. Or 
perhaps a distinction should be drawn between cases involving an allegation of a 
breach of the duty of care and cases involving a conflict of interests. An allegation 
of a breach of duty of care will almost always involve an allegation of a wrong or 
bad business decision. But such decisions are as likely to result from negligence as 
they are from pure bad luck.82 In contrast, conflict situations involving self-serving 
behaviour are more likely to be culpable and at the expense of corporate interest. 
The business judgment rule should therefore have no role in these latter 
situations. 
 
In the United States, boards have tried to ensure the application of the business 
judgment rule to the demand refusal situation by creating a special committee of 
the board, often called a special litigation committee whose purpose is to decide 
whether to pursue the action or not. Such committees are comprised of directors 
who are not interested in the challenged action and who are independent of the 
defendant directors. The experience in the United States with these committees 
has been that they almost invariably recommend that the derivative suit be 
dismissed.83 Quillen, J of the Supreme Court of Delaware put the problem as 
follows: 
 
 We must be mindful that directors are passing judgment on fellow directors… 
who designated them to serve both as directors and committee members. The 
question naturally arises whether a ‘there but for the grace of God go I’ 
empathy might not play a role. And the further question arises whether 
inquiry as to independence, good faith and reasonable investigation is 
sufficient safeguard against abuse, perhaps subconscious abuse.84 
 
The English Law Commission envisaged the use of such committees. It 
recommended that a judge should have regard for the opinion of an independent 





Under the common law, if a wrong has been effectively ratified by the company, 
this will constitute a complete bar to a derivative action. The effect of the 
ratification will be to ‘cure the wrong’ so that there is no cause of action in respect 
of which the company (and therefore the shareholder through the derivative 
action) can bring proceedings. Even where there has been no formal ratification as 
such but the wrong is one that is capable of being ratified, it may not be possible 
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for a minority shareholder to bring a derivative action.86 The difficulty is in 
deciding which types of wrongs are ratifiable and which are not. Section 216B does 
away with this problem by providing that the fact the alleged breach of a right or a 
duty owed to the company may be approved by the members is not by itself 
sufficient for a stay or dismissal of the action. The court in making an order under 
section 216A may however take such approval into account. Thus, evidence of 
approval by the general meeting would be taken into account by the court in 
deciding whether to grant leave or not but is not by itself fatal to the action.  
 
The view of the UK Law Commission is that ratification should continue to be 
effective in the cases where it is currently effective to bar an action by a minority 
shareholder.87 Thus, the fact that a wrong is ratifiable will not prevent a 
shareholder from commencing a derivative action. However, if there has been 
effective ratification, then the action cannot proceed as there will be no subsisting 
cause of action vested in the company which the shareholder can pursue. Some 
commentators have expressed reservation with this view as the vexed question of 
whether and when an attempted ratification is ‘effective’ remains.88 Curiously, it 
appears that in New Zealand, the statutory derivative action may not be available 
in respect of a wrong that can be ratified by a majority of shareholders because of 
section 177(4)89 of the Companies Act 1993.90  
 
In addition, section 216B provides that no proceeding brought under section 216A 
can be stayed, or discontinued without the approval of the court. This, provision, 
which has its roots in American civil procedure, is to prevent strike suits, brought 
for the sole purpose of and in the hope of reaching some collusive settlement for 
the benefit of the complainant and the defendants, usually at the expense of the 
company.  
 
Areas for a Revisit 
 
The statutory derivative action has great expectations of it as a tool of protecting 
shareholder rights. In Canada, where the statutory derivative action has been 
operative for many years already, there has not been an abundance of cases in the 
area, although there have been some important cases. Canadian writers have 
therefore opined that the statutory derivative action has failed to make a dramatic 
                                                 
86  Thus, a breach such as that in Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942] 1 All ER 378 
cannot sustain a derivative action.  
87  Report para 6.84. 
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impact.91 This need not necessarily be so. Given the deterrence objective of the 
action, a positive interpretation could be that the action is indeed working! If the 
courts had been swamped with derivative applications, the fear expressed by the 
UK Law Commission and others that availability of the action will enhance the 
scope for involving companies in futile and disruptive litigation92 will certainly be 
vindicated. Be that as it may, there are some areas in which the Singapore 
statutory derivative action could be improved upon to improve the potential utility 
quotient of the action. This is not to encourage shareholder litigation for its own 
sake, but rather, to ensure that the exercise of bona fide shareholder power to 
commence litigation is not discouraged, and also to ensure that the statutory 
derivative action has a fair go at reaching its potential as a tool of corporate 
governance.  
 
The Exclusion of Listed Companies 
 
In contrast to the Canadian provisions and those of other jurisdictions, the 
Singapore statutory derivative action applies only in connection with companies 
that are not listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange.93 The Select Committee gave 
its reasons for the exclusion of the listed company in the following terms: 
 
 The Committee was of the view that the proceedings and performance of 
public listed companies are already monitored by various regulatory 
authorities and disgruntled shareholders of such companies have an avenue 
in that they can sell their shares in the open market.94 
 
The move to exclude listed companies from the purview of section 216A was 
described as ‘controversial’.95 The ability of regulatory authorities and agencies to 
monitor management is necessarily bound by budgetary and perhaps political 
constraints. Whilst the exclusion can perhaps be justified to some extent by 
reference to the checks imposed by market forces, the effectiveness of market 
forces, particularly in relation to day-to-day accountability96 and one-time 
breaches of duty,97 is limited. To deny the listed shareholder the availability of a 
statutory derivative action on the basis that he has the option of selling his shares 
on the market is to ignore the deterrent effect of the provision. Perversely, this 
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may actually provide wrongdoers with a perceived sense of immunity.98 The 
derivative action is a remedy for shareholders who want to remain in the 
company. 
 
There are indications supporting the extension of the applicability of the statutory 
derivative action to listed companies. 
 
First, although listed companies have widely dispersed shareholdings, many 
Singapore listed companies remain in the control of majority shareholders. In fact, 
according to one survey of the ownership structure of companies listed on the 
stock exchange of Singapore,99 the median proportion of shares held by majority 
shareholders is in excess of 60 %, which is very high compared with many 
developed countries. These shareholders are mainly government-linked companies 
and statutory boards, individuals who founded the company and other corporate 
entities. In these companies, majority shareholders are frequently represented on 
the board. The very composition of the board would probably depend on the 
majority shareholders and it is not inconceivable that the personal preferences, 
objectives or vision of these shareholders be prioritised at the expense of the 
minority. While there may be concerns that to over-arm the minority (particularly 
an over-zealous minority) will cause more harm then good, the safeguards built 
into the action are meant to address these very fears.  
 
Second, the listed company regime in Singapore has recently moved towards the 
principle of caveat emptor. The Singapore stock exchange amended its listing 
manual in 1998, making previously compulsory corporate governance rules into a 
separate best practices guide, which is not compulsory,100 and allowing greater 
leeway for interpretation of these guidelines. In line with this, the new Code of 
Corporate Governance also calls for greater shareholder participation in listed 
companies.101 
 
The assumption here is that shareholders will enforce their own rights and play a 
part in the control of directors. The fact that the state regulatory body is taking 
several steps back suggests that there will be a need to enhance the position of 
public listed shareholders. Increased shareholder intervention in publicly-held 
companies, appropriately constrained, is necessary for improved corporate 
                                                 
98  Koh, above n 66, 84. 
99  YT Mak and PH Phan, ‘Corporate Governance in Singapore: Recent Developments for 
the Next Millennium’, paper presented at the Federation of ASEAN Economic 
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governance.102 If the statutory derivative action could be extended to these 
shareholders, they would potentially have a bigger role in the governance of 
management and a greater chance of protecting their interests.  
 
Thirdly, there appears to be a shift in the mindset and approach of the 
Singaporean shareholder. It used to be the common perception that Singaporean 
shareholders were a passive lot, particular the smaller investors. The sanctity of 
that generalisation appears to be slowly eroding. Perhaps all that was required 
was a spark to ignite latent fires, and that spark came in the form of a ban by the 
Malaysian Government on the trading of Malaysian shares on Singapore’s over-
the-counter exchange, the Central Limit Order Book, in late 1998.103 The 
establishment of the Securities Investors Association of Singapore came about 
shortly thereafter. The SIAS now has a membership of some 54,000 and is the 
unofficial ‘watchdog for minority rights’. With the backing of the SIAS, minority 
shareholders have in recent times been taking directors of listed companies to 
task, over issues of director remuneration104 as well as dividend payments.  
 
Fourth, there is the potential corporate governance role for the institutional 
investor105 in Singapore, at least theoretically. Institutional dominance of the 
stock market has been on the rise over the years in jurisdictions such as the 
United Kingdom,106 United States and Australia.107 Whilst such institutional 
shareholders are not significant players on the Singapore market yet, the 
concentration of share ownership in funds owned and/or managed by institutional 
investors can only increase, particularly since the Singapore Government has been 
making efforts to encourage the development of the funds management 
industry.108 For the institutional investor, the typical ‘dumping’ response to 
mismanagement in listed companies would not be a viable option.109 A sale of 
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large blocks of shares by an institutional investor is very likely to send the wrong 
kinds of signals to the market, resulting in an adverse effect on the share price. To 
protect their portfolios therefore, it may be that increased activism on the part of 
institutional investors would be the only responsible way forward.  
 
Indeed, as Alastair Ross Goobey, the Chief Executive Officer of Hermes Pensions 
Management Ltd opined: 
 
 Too often, institutional shareholders have been concerned only with the 
health of the companies in which they are invested at that time… As the 
concentration of [share] ownership [in funds managed by institutional 
investment managers] has become more and more pronounced … the 
investors cannot simply pass the problem on to some unknown third party by 
selling shares. Either they will sell to another institution or in extremis, to 
new management through a bid. We start from the premise that early 
intervention and internal change will prove cheaper and more effective than 
either of these traditional routes… [W]e are aware that too many companies 
have been allowed to stumble on for some years without intervention from the 
shareholders … Too often this has ended in expensive takeover-bids that 
might have been avoided, had management been subject to some outside 
pressure from what are often called ‘activist’ institutional investors.110 
  
It might be argued that there is no need for an extension of the statutory action to 
listed companies because the role of monitoring management may be more 
effectively undertaken by the independent directors on the board. The new Code of 
Corporate Governance envisages an enhanced role for the independent director in 
public listed companies and recommends that at least a third of the board be 
independent directors. An independent director is one who has no relationship 
with the company, its related companies or its officers that could interfere, or be 
reasonably perceived to interfere, with the exercise of the director’s independent 
business judgment with a view to the best interests of the company.111 If these 
independent directors take on a ‘supervisory’ role, these ‘supervisory directors’ can 
then undertake the function of monitoring the board. To be effective monitors, 
however, such independent directors have to be genuinely independent of the 
board. This requires proper selection112 (and not only proper appointment) 
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procedures to be in place to ensure independence. This obviously raises costs as a 
result of increased bureaucracy and one is then pushed to ask what real 
advantage such monitoring has over empowering the shareholders themselves. An 
independent director has to be independent not only in name but also in deed. To 
the extent that the issue of structural bias remains, judicial oversight continues to 
be necessary. 
 
The real concern, as was also a concern of the English Law Commission,113 is the 
fear of increased shareholder litigation in public companies resulting in over-
interference in the management of the company and the effect this might have on 
the decision-making process by the directors. As the Law Commission puts it, the 
company may very well be ‘killed by kindness’.114 In addition, there is the 
potential for the risk-averse amongst the directors to flee the board, which is a 
concern that cannot be ignored in the Singapore context, given the small pool of 
public company directors.115 One possibility that might allay these fears is to limit 
the applicability of the derivative procedure to claims arising out of breaches of 
directors’ duties. This is the Law Commission’s approach116 and does seem a 
sensible117 position to take, particularly given the purpose118 behind the 
introduction of the statutory procedure considered earlier.119 There is merit in 
throwing open the gates to shareholder litigation but certainly not overly widely, 
as the benefits in the name of corporate governance of so doing are, at the 
moment, more perceived than real. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
companies that were representative of all major industrial sectors of varying sizes. 
113 Poole and Roberts, above n 88, 102; see Law Commission’s Guiding Principles as set 
out in para 1.9 of LCR No 246. 
114  Guiding principle (v). 
115  It is common to find directors sitting on multiple boards, with some highly sought-
after individuals sitting on as many as 50 boards: A Teo, ‘Multi-board directors will 
become notable exceptions’, The Business Times (14 May 2001) <http://business-
times.asia1.com.sg>. Admittedly, many of these positions are likely to be non-
executive positions but Singapore law does not impose different fiduciary standards on 
the different categories of directors. 
116  LCR No 246, paras 6.23 - 6.49. The recommendation is that the derivative action 
‘should only be available if the cause of action arises as a result of an actual or 
threatened act or omission involving (a) negligence, default, breach of duty or breach 
of trust by a director of the company, or (b) a director putting himself in a position 
where his personal interests conflict with his duties to the company.’ 
117  Cheffins, above n 5, 243. 
118  That of preserving the utility and efficacy of directors’ duties as a system of control 
over management. 
119  The Canadian experience indicates to some extent that such a move is unnecessary as 
the cases have typically involved allegations of self-serving conduct on the part of the 
company’s directors. These cases have however, involved mostly closely-held 
corporations: see Cheffins, above n 5, 241. 
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Notwithstanding all that has been said, it is interesting to point out that all 
applications in New Zealand and the majority of cases in Canada, have been in 
respect of closely-held companies. 
 
The Oppression Alternative 
 
The statutory oppression remedy was first introduced in England120 in recognition 
of the fact that minority shareholders often faced considerable problems in 
obtaining appropriate remedies and as an alternative to the just and equitable 
winding up option. Similar legislation can be found, among other English-based 
jurisdictions, in Canada,121 Australia,122 New Zealand,123 Singapore124 and 
Malaysia.125  
 
The introduction of the oppression remedy reflected a concern of the legislators 
over the weak position of the minority shareholder. Although the majority view 
should prevail in a corporate context, the interests of the minority must also be 
catered for. Although various terms (such as ‘oppression’ and ‘prejudice’) are found 
in the oppression provision, the basic idea behind it is to give a shareholder 
standing to complain that the affairs of the company were being conducted in a 
manner that was unfair to him. The remedy is couched in wide terms. The 
shareholder can complain about transactions that occurred prior to his becoming a 
member, and even where the unfairness was not directed at him. Because of the 
breadth with which the provision is usually couched, it is possible that mal-
administration of the company’s affairs by the directors can amount to oppressive 
or unfair conduct. The complaint need not be confined only to the conduct of the 
directors or of the general meeting but can relate to the conduct of anyone who is 
taking part in the conduct of the affairs of the company. The essential criterion 
behind the provision is commercial unfairness. This would include the actions of 
persons with de facto control of the company such as a shadow director or an 
influential shareholder and possibly even a related company. 
 
The oppression remedy has been used as a way around the rule in Foss v Harbottle  
for the shareholder who wanted to have the acts of directors or the majority 
reviewed. The oppression provision does not require the action to be framed as a 
derivative action, the shareholder being given standing in his own right. In 
                                                 
120  Section 210 UK Companies Act 1948. This provision provided relief for members 
where the company’s affairs were being conducted in an oppressive manner. The 
provision was unfortunately interpreted restrictively by the English courts and was 
only of limited use to minority shareholders. The provision has since been replaced by 
section 459 UK Companies Act 1985, which has since developed into an extremely 
valuable remedy for the minority shareholder: see Farrar et al, above n 8. 
121  Eg section 241 Canada Business Corporations Act. 
122  Section 232 Corporations Act 2001. 
123  Section 165 Companies Act 1993. 
124  Section 216 Companies Act Cap 50. 
125  Section 181 Malaysian Companies Act. 
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addition, the provision gives the courts wide powers to redress the grievances of 
the petitioning shareholder.  One of the orders that the court is empowered to 
make under the provision is the order to authorise civil proceedings in the name of 
and on behalf of the company, subject to such conditions as the court may 
impose.126 This is equivalent to a derivative action for wrongs done to the 
company.  
 
A wrong to the company may result in unhappy shareholders shouting oppression. 
If the court adopts a flexible view of the oppression section, a shareholder could 
effectively bring an essentially derivative action as a personal one. Aggrieved 
shareholders are unlikely to be concerned with the niceties of interpretation and 
given the choice, would probably prefer to proceed under the oppression provision 
with its easier procedural requirements and wider range of judicial remedies, if 
this is at all possible. 
 
In New Zealand, one commentator127 opined when the statutory derivative action 
was newly introduced that it may be ‘overshadowed’ by the New Zealand unfair 
prejudice provisions.128 Australian commentators129 too expressed similar 
sentiment vis-à-vis the Companies and Securities Law Review Committee’s 
proposal130 to introduce a statutory derivative action into Australian corporate 
law, given the existing section 232131 of the Corporations Act 2001. In Canada too, 
the primary reason relied upon for the relatively fewer cases on the statutory 
derivative action is that unhappy shareholders are much more likely to use the 
oppression remedy given its procedural advantages over the statutory derivative 
action.132 In Canada, the relationship between the oppression remedy and the 
derivative action is not clearly defined. Some cases have held that the proper and 
only avenue for derivative wrongs is the derivative action but others have 
expressly allowed derivative wrongs to be redressed under the oppression 
provision.133 In other cases, apparent corporate wrongs, which should therefore be 
                                                 
126  Section 216(2)(c). 
127 G Shapira, ‘Minority Buy-outs and Derivative Actions in New Zealand’, paper 
presented at the 1994 National Corporate Law Teachers Conference, UTS Sydney. 
128  Section 174, 1993 Companies Act. 
129  Ramsay, above n 27, 173; J Kluver, ‘Derivative Actions and the Rule in Foss v 
Harbottle: Do We Need a Statutory Remedy’, [1993] 11 Companyies and Securities 
Law Journal 7, 25. 
130  Companies and Securities Law Review Committee, Discussion Paper No 11, 1990. 
131  Which embodies the Australian oppression remedy and is based on section 210 of the 
UK Companies Act 1948. 
132  These advantages include the fact that leave does not have to be obtained in order to 
petition under the oppression section, and any remedy granted would be more likely to 
benefit the applicant personally. 
133  JF MacIntosh, ‘The Oppression Remedy: Personal or Derivative?’ (1991) 70 Canadian 
Bar Review 27, 46; B Cheffins and J Dine, ‘Shareholder Remedies: Lessons from 
Canada’, (1992) 13 The Company Lawyer 89 at 94. 
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the subject of derivative actions, have without comment, been litigated under the 
oppression section.134 
 
Interestingly enough, this ‘overlap’ potential was envisaged by the Select 
Committee in Singapore. The Companies Amendment Bill135 proposed the deletion 
of section 216(2)(c),136 making it clear that section 216A is the only avenue for the 
commencement of derivative actions. The proposed deletion was however not 
made in the Amendment Act. It is likely that this was the result of a submission 
by Professor D Prentice and Mr Lee Beng Tat that ‘while the proposed deletion is 
clearly intended to make the remedy available under section 216 a personal 
remedy, it may turn out at the end of an action under section 216 that the most 
appropriate remedy would be to allow the applicant to bring an action under the 
new section 216A. While section 216 does allow a court to ‘make such order as it 
thinks fit’, the deliberate deletion of a provision like… subsection (2)(c) may 
suggest that it was intended that the court should not have the power under 
section 216 to make an order to authorise an action to be brought under section 
216A…’. It was proposed that section 216(2)(c) be amended to read ‘authorise 
proceedings under section 216A to be brought in the name of or on behalf of the 
company by such person or persons and on such terms as the court may direct’. 
This proposal was not adopted, although the marginal note to section 216 was 
changed from ‘Remedies in cases of oppression and injustice’ to ‘Personal remedies 
in cases of oppression and injustice’.  
 
That this is insufficient to avoid interpretative confusion is illustrated by the 
judicial approach taken in at least one relatively recent case. In Re Eng Cheong 
Peng Kee Pte Ltd; Janie Low v Low Peng Boon & Ors,137 the plaintiff, Janie Low 
sought an order under section 216 of the Singapore Companies Act alleging that 
the affairs of the company, in which she had a minority stake, had been conducted 
in a manner oppressive to her interests in the company. She was the daughter of 
the first defendant and the half brother and cousin of the second and third 
defendants respectively. She, and the first to third defendants, were directors of 
the company. It was alleged, inter alia, that the first defendant had used the 
company’s funds to pay for holidays overseas for himself and numerous 
companions, that the company’s accounts were not in order, that there had been a 
procedural irregularity in the manner in which the first to third defendants had 
approved the accounts of the company’s subsidiaries, that the company and its 
subsidiaries had substantial profits but had refrained for many years from 
declaring dividends because the terms of the memorandum and articles of the 
companies made it favourable to the first defendant for profits not to be 
distributed as dividends, that the company’s funds had been used to purchase an 
                                                 
134  Cheffin and Dine, ibid, at 94. 
135  No 33 of 1992. 
136  Which allows the court to authorise civil proceedings to be brought in the name of the 
company. 
137  [1998] 3 SLR 1. 
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expensive luxury car for the third defendant. These allegations could very well 
have founded an action for breach of directors’ duties and should therefore have 
been litigated as a corporate wrong. No mention of section 216A was made in the 
judgment. The Singapore High Court held that there was the clearest evidence of 
a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing and a violation of the 
conditions of fair play by the first, second and third defendants. The court 
therefore considered that the appropriate remedy in the circumstances was an 
order requiring the first, second and third defendants to buy out Janie Low’s 
shares at a fair and proper value. The wrongdoing directors were ‘penalised’ in 
that they had to purchase the plaintiff’s shares but this merely consolidated their 
control over the company and certainly nothing was achieved in the name of 
managerial accountability. 
 
If Ms Low had commenced a section 216A application, the only ‘benefit’ to her 
would be the knowledge that she has possibly contributed to a wider good and 
probably an order that the company bears the costs of the action. Given the choice 
therefore, which individual will want to pursue a derivative action for the 
company’s, rather than her personal, benefit?138 Obviously such a position is 
undesirable. To avoid an evisceration139 of section 216A, it would be necessary to 
make clear that in respect of all actions that are essentially derivative in 
character, the shareholder must obtain leave to commence the action.  
 
The Lack of Incentives for Shareholders 
 
The question who bears the costs of any litigation action plays a large part in the 
decision whether to commence an action. In derivative actions, this concern is 
particularly acute since, by the very nature of the action, the benefits of the suit 
flow to the company as a whole, with the individual shareholder receiving only a 
small pro-rata benefit. This and the fact that the other shareholders will free-ride 
on the plaintiff shareholder’s action creates a disincentive to commence 
litigation.140 Notwithstanding the fact that it is the company that takes the benefit 
of the action, the individual shareholder who institutes the action, unless it is 
otherwise provided, will have to be responsible for the litigation costs of the action. 
Under the Singapore system, if the action is unsuccessful, the plaintiff will have to 
bear the legal costs of the defendants.  
 
The common law recognised the financial difficulties of the intrepid shareholder in 
Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2)141. Lord Denning observed that: 
                                                 
138  A similar problem exists in New Zealand. See Holden v Architectural Finishes Ltd 
(1996) 7 NZCLC 260,796 where a wrong to the company was held to constitute 
oppressive conduct resulting in relief being granted to the minority shareholder. See 
discussion in Taylor, above n 44, 324. 
139  Per Barry J in Pappas v Acan Windows Inc (1991) 2 BLR (2d) 180, 214. 
140  Ramsay, above n 27, 163. 
141  [1975] QB 373. 
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 [T]he minority shareholder, being an agent acting on behalf of the company, is 
entitled to be indemnified by the company against all costs and expensed 
reasonable incurred by him in the course of the agency… Seeing that if the 
action succeeds the whole benefit will go to the company, it is only just that 
the minority shareholder should be indemnified against the costs he incurs on 
its behalf… But what if the action fails? Assuming that the minority 
shareholder had reasonable grounds for bringing the action – that it was a 
reasonable and prudent course to take in the interests of the company – he 
should not himself be liable to pay the costs of the other side, but the company 
itself should be liable, because he was acting for it and not himself. In 
addition, he should himself be indemnified by the company, in respect of his 
own costs even if the action fails.142 
 
Under the Singapore provisions, the courts ‘may make such orders or interim 
orders as it thinks fit in the interests of justice… including…an order requiring 
the company to pay reasonable legal fees and disbursements incurred by the 
complainant in connection with the action’.143 Additionally, the Court is given the 
power to order, at any time, the company to pay the complainant interim costs but 
the complainant may be accountable for these interim costs upon the final 
disposition of the application or action.144  
 
The Singapore position is unlike that in New Zealand, where section 166 of their 
Companies Act 1993 provides: 
 
The Court shall, on the application of the member or director to whom leave 
was granted under section 165 of this Act to bring or to intervene in the 
proceedings, order that the whole or part of the reasonable costs of bringing or 
intervening in the proceedings, including any costs relating to any settlement, 
compromise, or discontinuance approved under section 168 of this Act, must 
be met by the company unless the Court considers that is would be unjust or 
inequitable for the company to bear the costs. (emphasis added) 
 
It appears reasonably clear that the intent of the section is to lay the costs of the 
derivative action at the door of the company provided leave has been granted 
under section 165 and unless the interests of justice and equity dictate otherwise. 
This makes perfect sense. Once leave has been granted, the applicant would have 
convinced the court that it is appropriate in the instant case for leave to be 
granted. Under the New Zealand section 165, the court would have considered 
factors such as the likelihood of the proceedings succeeding, the costs of the 
proceedings and the interests of the company. In addition, the court would have to 
be satisfied that either the company does not itself intend to bring the action or 
that it is not in the company’s interests that the conduct of the proceedings be left 
to the directors or to the shareholders in general meeting. As such, there is little 
                                                 
142  Ibid, at 391 –392. 
143  Section 216A(5c). 
144  Section 216A(5). 
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reason why the company should not be required to meet the costs of the applicant 
in conducting the proceedings.145  
 
Notwithstanding this enlightened provision, which also differs from the Canadian 
provisions, the New Zealand court in the first decision on the statutory derivative 
action managed to inject some uncertainty into the applicant’s position as to costs 
in the case of Vrij v Boyle.146 In the case, Fisher J did so by ordering that ‘all 
questions of costs and indemnity from the company should be reserved pending 
the outcome of the action on the merits’.147 To the extent that this makes an award 
of costs dependent on the outcome of the substantive action, it would be at odds 
with section.148 Nevertheless, orders that the company met the reasonable costs of 
the proceedings were made in subsequent cases.149 
 
It would be a rare shareholder indeed who would fly in the face of all the 
recognised disincentives of derivative litigation. There is therefore merit in the 
proposal that once the court grants leave to the applicant to commence derivative 
proceedings on behalf of the company, it should be mandatory for the company to 
pay the costs of the proceedings.150 There is perhaps less imperative for legislation 
to provide explicitly that the costs of the application too should be borne by the 
company. In the New Zealand case of Thorrington v McCann,151 the High Court 
ordered that costs in the application be fixed at a particular sum but that the 
liability for payment ‘be determined by the final outcome of the substantive 
proceeding’. Thus, if the action is successful, the applicant is reimbursed, if not, he 
would have to bear the costs of the application. The justification for this approach 
can be found the following words of Tysoe J of the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia:152 
 
Many decisions in the course of litigation in my view are influenced by 
attendant legal costs and it is appropriate in my view that the person having 
the conduct of a derivative action should make the legal decisions bearing in 
mind that they will not necessarily reimbursed for the legal costs…The 
matter of the legal fees will, in a sense, be the litmus test for this proceeding. 
If [the applicants] are prepared to prosecute the derivative proceeding with 
the risk that they may not be reimbursed for the legal costs incurred by them, 
                                                 
145  Ramsay, above n 27, 164. 
146  (1995) 7 NZBLC 260 846. 
147  Vrij v Boyle (1995) 7 NZBLC 260 846 at 269 849 (emphasis added). See Fitzsimons, 
‘The Companies Act 1993: A New Approach to Shareholder Litigation in New Zealand’, 
(1997) 18 The Company Lawyer 306 at 309-310. 
148  Ibid. 
149  See MacFarlane v Barlow (1997) 8 NZCLC 261, 470 where the court ordered that the 
company meet the whole costs of bringing the proceedings. In Thorrington v McCann 
(1998) 8 NZCLC 261 564, no order for costs could be made as there was no application 
under section 166 by the plaintiff. 
150  Ramsay, above n 27, 164. 
151  (1998) 8 NZCLC 261 564. 
152  Intercontinental Precious Metals Inc v Cooke (1993) 10 BLR (2d) 203 at 225 and 226. 
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it will tend to substantiate their positions that they are acting in good faith 
and that they do believe the pursuit of the action to be in the best interest of 
[the company]. 
 
Whilst the learned judge extended this reasoning to the issue of costs of the 
substantive action, it is submitted that this really does go too far. Such a position 
is likely to deter unbiased shareholders but might not prevent someone bent on 
grinding a personal axe.  It would be far more reasonable and equitable to limit 
the reasoning to the costs of the application. After all, once leave is granted, the 
applicant would have cleared the twin hurdles of good faith and the action being 
in the interests of the company.  
 
That the issue of costs has a great impact on the utility of the statutory derivative 
action can be seen from the Japanese experience. Japan’s present statutory 
derivative action153 evolved from an original version154 that was borrowed from 
Germany. In Japan, there is a strong traditional cultural aversion to litigation as 
a means of settling disputes.155 Indeed, litigation, it seems, is seen as a ‘dangerous 
characteristic of the foreigner who does not know better’.156 Notwithstanding this 
cultural position, Japanese shareholders have, in recent years, been stepping up 
lawsuits against corporate leaders using the derivative action157. Seen against a 
corporate scene of management control and ignored shareholder interests, this 
state of affairs could indicate a general trend for increasing litigation, particularly 
in commercial matters, perhaps fuelled in part by the increasing exposure the 
Japanese have to Western influence and expressions of individualism and 
liberty.158 The real reason, however, is not merely the general shift in attitude but 
the dramatic changes in Japanese law in late 1993 making it easier and cheaper159 
for shareholders to bring derivative suits. 
 
While the availability of an order for costs ameliorates the burden of positive 
action on the part of the shareholder, it does not provide an incentive160 to act. 
                                                 
153  Articles 267 –268-3 Commercial Code. 
154  Shoho [Commercial Code], unamended 1899 provisions, Art 178, reprinted in Kyuhorei 
Shu [Old Laws and Ordinances] 329 (1968). See deVere Stevens, above n 25, 127. 
155  A Williams, ‘Japan’s Recipe for Dispute Resolution’ [1996] International Commercial 
Litigation 2; T L’Estrange, ‘Major Issues in Litigation in the Asia Pacific Rim’ [1996] 
International Commercial Litigation 24. 
156  Williams, above n 155, 2. 
157  S Wada, ‘Empowered Shareholders Step Up Lawsuits Against Corporate Leaders: 
Commercial Code Revisions Make Court Action Easier’ Nikkei Weekly, 11 October 
1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File. 
158  Williams, above n 155. 
159  After the amendment to the Commercial Code, shareholders in Japan file derivative 
law suits for a uniform ¥8,200 as opposed to a filing fee which approximated 0.5% of 
the compensation claim, a figure which usually made it unfeasible to file such suits: 
see Wada, above n 157. 
160  In this respect, one should consider the unique position in the US where the derivative 
action is driven not by incentives being made available to shareholders but by 
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Recovery in a derivative suit is the right of the company, not the litigant 
shareholder. Indeed, if the wrongdoers remain in control of the company, an 
award of damages to the company perversely benefits the wrongdoers! In this 
regard, it is submitted that the Singapore action could be improved with an 
express power conferred on the courts to order that recovery be made directly to 
the shareholders or former shareholders of the company. In the Canadian 
Business Corporations Act, the court has the power to make an order 
‘compensating an aggrieved person’.161 Section 167 of the New Zealand Companies 
Act is more explicit. It provides that the court may make ‘an order directing that 
any amount ordered to be paid by a defendant in the proceedings must be paid, in 
whole or part, to former and present shareholders of the company or related 
company instead of to the company or related company’. Such an order prevents 





Advances in technology have allowed companies to grow to sizes not previously 
imaginable. The divorce between ownership and control is a natural by-product of 
this growth. As more powers in relation to the running of the company were 
conferred on the management, the shareholder’s position in the company was 
increasingly being relegated to a small backseat, waiting only to receive dividends, 
if these were declared. In addition, certain problems are compounded when the 
majority in a company backs the management. Plentiful opportunities remained 
for the corporate form to be manipulated to the management’s and the majority’s 
own ends. With the shareholders’ hands tied with legal strings, courtesy of Foss v 
Harbottle, an important check on mismanagement was not allowed its full 
potential. A certain level of shareholder activism ought to be encouraged. 
 
The risk of course is that encouraging shareholder involvement may result in 
increased counter-productive litigation. Indeed, the one thing that appears most 
capable of raising the ire of shareholders is that thorny issue of directors’ fees. 
Giving the shareholders new powers with which to litigate may result in 
shareholders launching challenges on directors’ fees, ignoring competitive salary 
levels and the ability of the company to attract competent and capable directors. 
                                                                                                                                 
incentives available to the legal profession. The US system of contingency fees entitles 
an attorney representing a shareholder who brings a successful derivative action to a 
counsel fee award from the amount received by the corporation. These counsel fee 
awards, which historically amount to a substantial 20 -30 per cent, provide lawyers 
with a financial incentive to seek out derivative litigation and ‘perform the socially 
useful function of deterring undesirable conduct’: see JC Coffee, ‘Understanding the 
Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of 
Law through Class Actions’ (1986) 86 Colombia Law Review 669. 
161  Section 241(3)(j). 
162  Taylor, above n 44, 326. 
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This would certainly be undesirable, bearing in mind that even having to defend 
one action that is without merit is a waste of resources. 
 
Nevertheless, increasing the scope for shareholder intervention in the hope of 
enhancing corporate accountability is laudable, provided the necessary safeguards 
are in place. Potential investors must have the confidence that the officers of 
corporate entities operate them honestly and in the best interest of the 
shareholders, both majority and minority. If not, they must believe that they can 
do something about it. It would certainly be too late to make legislative amends if 
perceived managerial ineptitude and corporate wrongdoing manifest themselves 
in the form of a lack of investor confidence. Inevitably, allowing for increased 
shareholder activism will foster a new reality that management will have to take 
greater account of shareholder interests and rights. As Professor Coffee opined 
almost a decade ago, ‘the knowledge that one is being watched and that one must 
justify one’s actions improves the behaviour of most individuals’.163  
 
The statutory derivative action was therefore enacted in Singapore in response to 
these issues, and it has been 8 years since. In late 1999, the Ministry of Finance, 
together with the Monetary Authority of Singapore and the Attorney-General’s 
Chambers set up three private-sector led committees to review the corporate 
regulatory framework, disclosure standards and corporate governance in 
Singapore. One of these was the Committee on Company Legislation and 
Regulatory Framework. Its mandate is to ‘undertake a comprehensive and 
coherent review of our company law and regulatory framework and recommend a 
modern company law and regulatory framework for Singapore which not only 
accords with global standards but also promote a competitive economy’. This is 
thus an opportune time to revisit the Singapore provisions and consider those 
areas in which the action can be improved upon. It is hoped that this paper 
contributes towards that aim. 
                                                 
163  Coffee, above n 82 1425. 
